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This year's Veblen-Commons Award recipient, Seymour Melman, has warned
that the laws and decisions allowing and encouraging the spread of cost-plus contracts have diminished productive capacity, increased production costs, created unearned profits, and weakened democratic institutions l [Melman 1983, 1993]. The
concern of this paper is the political organization of the Central Interstate LowLevel Radioactive Waste Compact (CIC) and the cost-plus contract system that it
proposes to use in establishing a low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) facility. The
current plan is to transport radioactive waste from the LLRW generators in Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska to a disposal facility at the north
edge of Nebraska.

Political Goals and Problems of Compacts
In 1980, Congress passed legislation creating a decentralized system of LLRW
compacts. Two basic premises upon which the compact legislation was based have
proved incorrect. First, contrary to expectations, the stream of LLRW has continued to decrease since 1980 and is projected to continue to decline. Second, federal
compacts are not structured to be successful organizations for this kind of objective.

The authors are Professor and graduate student, respectively, of the Department of Economics,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln. F. Gregory Hayden is also a Commissioner on the Central Interstate
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Commission. The authors want to thank William C. Snider for his
excellent research and computer assistance. This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the
Association for Evolutionary Economics, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 4-6, 1997.
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The growth of federal interstate compacts has been limited in the United States
because of the unique circumstances necessary to make them successful. To be successful, all states involved need to share benefits or burdens. All states need to have
something to gain or all need to have something to lose. For example, interstate
compacts have been vital and effective political organizations for regulating and
sharing the benefits of rivers, conservation districts, taxation, education, and for
controlling and sharing the costs of disease control and prisoner release. The federally mandated LLRW compacts are inconsistent with a theory of shared benefits and
costs. Instead, they are formed so that states in each compact are required to select
one state in the compact and force building of the LLRW facility in that state.
This "ganging up" on one state, coupled with the public's growing fear of radiation and public knowledge of past industrial and governmental irresponsibility with
regard to nuclear waste [Zinberg 1982, 160], has led to strong efforts to stop, delay,
or reform the siting of nuclear facilities [see Lidskog 1994]. The responses vary
from the lawsuit brought by Governor Cuomo of New York, to the refusal to allow
for federal transfer of land ownership in California, to the current charges of minority discrimination by groups in Texas who claim a site in that state is being considered because the majority of the citizens near the site location are minorities. In
other cases, compacts and states have simply required that appropriate research and
study be completed before a site is selected. To all of these examples, protest demonstrations and a regular flow of studies by citizen groups can be added. These responses have been met by strong, and occasionally brutal, counter-responses by
industrial groups, compact officials, and government agencies. The system has not
worked. In 16 years, there has not been a facility approved for construction. Thus,
many, including governors and U.S. senators, have suggested that we admit the
compact system has not been a success and return the issue to the federal government.
Craig Zeisler, the Nebraska alternative commissioner, has stated a more farreaching political reason why the issue should be returned to the federal government. If a compact system (whereby the federal government requires a group of
states to mandate that only one state bear the group's burden) is allowed to succeed,
then our nation can expect many similar federally mandated compacts for the unfair
allocation of social burdens. Zeisler explained that this would lead to numerous infringements on the sovereign rights of states in the future.

Overview of Problems of Central Interstate Compact
The expectation for successful LLRW compacts has diminished as the waste
stream itself has diminished. The falling waste stream, in conjunction with other institutional trends, creates particular problems with regard to the viability of the CIC
project. An integrated overview of these problems can be seen in Figure 1. John
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Figure 1. Incompatible Institutional Trends of Central Interstate Compact
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Campbell, writing on nuclear waste, argues that institutional analysis offers a clear
advantage because it provides a conceptual vehicle for "teasing out" the important
institutional constraints confronting policymakers [Campbell 1987, 29]. The institutional components teased out and compared in Figure 1 show incompatible institutional trends that serve as constraints to the CIC pr~ject.
Graph 1 in Figure 1 demonstrates the diminishing LLRW stream in the five-state
CIC. It is based on a study completed in August 1996 that found that although the
application for permission to build the facility estimated a constant stream of 53,000
cubic feet per year of LLRW over a 30-year life of the project, total LLRW in the
five states fell from a high point in 1980 to a level of approximately 12,000 cubic
feet in 1995. Due to technological advancements, new cleaning procedures, and better management, projections are that the waste stream will continue to decline [see
Hoffman and Hayden 1996]. The statistical projections are confirmed by discussions
with nuclear engineers. A national study completed after the CIC study found a
similar declining national trend [Fuchs 1996].
Graph 1 reveals conflict with the cost trends shown in Graphs 2 and 3. Cost-plus
contracting is causing a rapid escalation of preoperational costs as demonstrated in
Graph 2. An estimated beginning date of operation, if the application is approved
and construction finalized, is January 2001. Because of the high cost carried into the
operational phase, and with the small stream of waste, the cost per unit will be too
great to be covered in the early years by the revenues generated by the stream of
waste. Total costs will escalate as uncovered costs are carried over from year to
year. This is shown in Graph 3.
An additional problem with the high unpaid costs is the financial impact on
American Ecology Corporation (AEC), the corporation that has contracted to develop and operate the LLRW facility in Nebraska. The corporation that signed the
contract is US Ecology. However, it is a wholly owned subsidiary of AEC, and
AEC is designated in the contract. AEC's financial condition2 is tlX) fragile [see
Hayden 1996] to operate the facility for any period with the kind of financial crisis
resulting from the conflicting trends demonstrated in Graphs 1, 2, and 3. In addition, the current financial problems of AEC will worsen if the future expected now
of costs from operating the facility are not forthcoming because the revenues reported today by American Ecology are based, in part, on these expected operating
costs. The higher the cost projection by AEC f()r building and operating the facility,
the higher the revenues reported on AEC's lO-K Re!X)rt to the Security and Exchange Commission. Since the expectation that the excessive costs will ever be paid
given the information shown in Figure 1 is not realistic, the financial condition of
AEC will worsen.

Political and Economic Analysis of Low-Level

609

Cost-Plus Contracts
The contracts of concern are the contracts between CIC and AEC and between
CIC and the major electric generators of the five states, here called the "Contract"
and "Agreement" respectively.

Contract between CIC and AEC
The Contract3 consists of the original Contract signed June 6, 1987, and three
amendments. The cost aspects of the Contract can be translated into the first formula in Table 1. The formula articulates the Contract in conjunction with the practice that has evolved through interpretation by interested agencies that have been in
positions of power to reach a consensus and make decisions. 4
The first formula in Table I is for costs in the current prelicensing phase and is
set equal to the present value (PV) of the costs paid by CIC to AEC. The majority
of the payments go to Bechtel [see CIC Annual Report 1995-96] as the subcontractor to AEC. Before explaining the particulars of the formula, a word of caution: Do
not expect the payment formula to operate as usually expected in our economic system. In our system, we expect producing companies to sell stock or borrow funds,
pay interest on borrowed funds, buy equipment, and then develop and deliver a
product or a constructed facility as defined by the contract. This generally accepted
model for development and construction has not been followed with the CIC project. Instead, development costs have been borne by CIC and given to AEC free of
interest costs or lease payments. This does not just include operating expenses, but
also treats capital equipment as a gift to AEC and Bechtel. In addition, the constructed facility is not to be delivered to CIC, who contracted and paid for it to be
built. Ownership during operation remains with AEC. The way cost-plus contracts
increase cost becomes apparent by inspecting the particular terms in the formula as
follows:
A is the expenses of a sub-subcontractor whose contract with Bechtel does not
allow for a cost-plus adder.
B is the expenses of a sub-subcontractor who may add 10 percent to its cost before sending its invoice to Bechtel.
The total of the sub-subcontractor's invoices is increased by a 5 percent costplus adder by Bechtel and sent to AEC, which adds another 5 percent of that total
before sending the invoice to CIC.
C is Bechtel's own operating expenses, exclusive of payroll expenses and capital
equipment costs. The expenses, designated as C, are increased by 10 percent before
billing AEC. Then AEC increases the 110 percent total by another 5 percent.
D is Bechtel's home-office payroll expenses for this project. They are increased
by about 41.5 percent, and in turn, 78 percent of that total is added.
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E is Bechtel's non-horne-office payroll expenses for wages and salaries. It is increased by 41.5 percent, and that total is increased by 42.5 percent.
Then the totals of D and E, with their adders, as just explained, are increased by
a 10 percent cost-plus adder before the invoice is sent to AEC. AEC adds another 5
percent before sending the invoice to crc.
F is capital equipment that is bought for the subcontractor, Bechtel, by crc.
Bechtel selects the equipment, adds 10 percent onto the cost of the gift, and sends
the bill to AEC. AEC then takes the total 110 percent equipment cost and includes
another 5 percent adder of that sum before sending the invoice to crc.

Table 1. Fonnulae Expressing Contractual Tenns
A. Cost Terms of Contract between
PV =

crc and AEC

{{A

+ [B(l +.1O)]}{1 +.05}}{1 +.05} + [C(1 +.10)][1 +.05]
+ {([D(l +.415)] + [D(l +.415)][.78] + [E(l +.415)]

+ [E(l +.415)][.425]}{1 +.10}}{1 +.05} + [F(l +.10)][1 +.05]
+ G + [H(l +a)] + DEQ + [I(1 +.08)] + {[J(1 +.365)] + [I(1 +.365)][.75]
+ [K(l + .365)] + [K(l + .365)][.425]}{ 1 + .08} + [L(l + .08)] + M
B. Financing: Future Value Term of Agreement between

crc and Major Generators

y

FV=

L

PVj (1 + r + .06Sy-j

j-1987

FV - future value of financing from major generators to include accrued interest. j year PV was paid; first year being 1987. y - year to which loan is being accumulated. PVj - total value of financing to pay costs in year j. r- prime interest rate .
.065 - interest rate that is added to prime rate.
C. Financing: Future Value Term of Contract between

crc and AEC

y

FVAEC =

L

AECPVj(1 + .20y-j

j-1987

FV AEC - future value of financing from AEC, to include accrued interest. j - year
AECPV was contributed by AEC; first year being 1987. y - year to which loan is
being accumulated. AECPV - total value of financing to pay costs in year j .. 20 - interest paid on ACE financing.
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G, H, and DEQ are the expenses incurred by the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) in its role as licensing and regulating agency. The contractual arrangements are not included on the invoices. Therefore, it is assumed that
the sub-subcontractors are both stipulated sum- or unit-cost contracts without costplus adders, represented by G, and cost-plus contracts represented by H(l +a). The
a term represents the unknown percentage adder, if one exists. DEQ represents the
costs incurred by its own agency and does not include a cost-plus adder. Neither
does DEQ include a cost-plus adder to the costs of G and H. AEC does not add a
percentage to the DEQ invoice total before submitting it to CIC.
I represents AEC's own operating expenses, exclusive of payroll costs and capital equipment costs. As the contractor, AEC is allowed to include an 8 percent adder to its expenses before submitting them to CIC.
J is AEC's payments for home-office wages and salaries. J is increased by about
36.5 percent, and in turn 75 percent of that total is added.
K is AEC's payments for wages and salaries outside the home office. It is increased by about 36.5 percent, and that total is increased by 42.5 percent.
The totals of J and K, with their adders, as just explained, are increased by AEC
by 8 percent.
L represents capital equipment that is bought for AEC by CIC. AEC collects,
beyond the cost of the equipment, an adder of 8 percent of the cost of the equipment.
As with equipment bought for Bechtel, no lease charge is paid to CIC for using
the equipment; AEC owns the equipment so it can be included as an asset on its balance sheet; and AEC can claim the value of the tax deduction for the equipment's
depreciation. Then, AEC can apply other inputs, such as its own personnel, to the
equipment and send a bill to CIC for the cost of the other inputs, plus an 8 percent
adder.
M is the cost of lobbying expenses, upon which cost-plus adders are not allowed.
Since 1987, the total of the Contract costs is about $80 million.

Financing Agreement between CIC and Major Generators of Electricity
There are two sources for financing the costs incurred as a result of the Contract
terrns defined above. The main financing source is the loan Agreement between CIC
and the major generators of electricity in the five states. The major generators
agreed to finance the amount of the invoices submitted to CIC from AEC. Thus, the
costs are really being financed by the electric ratepayers. The loan receives an accrued interest rate of prime plus 6.5 percent; the total interest rate has reached 17
percent in some years. When the facility begins operation, the loan plus accrued interest will be amortized to be repaid as part of the charges to those depositing
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LLRW at the facility. The financing formula for the loan is defined in part B of Table I.
FV is the future value of the loan, to include accrued interest. PV, as explained
above, is the present value of the costs paid each time invoices are submitted by
AEC less what was financed by AEC's financing contribution (see below). Thus,
PV continues to grow by the interest rate on the loan. The total value of the loan to
pay the Contract costs, plus accrued interest, is currently about $130 million.

Financing by AEC
In the initial period of the Contract, a small part of the costs-about $6.2 millionwas financed by AEC. Since the interest rate on that loan has been 20 percent, the
formula for its future value, FV AEC, is defined as part C of Table 1. Its total value
currently is about $22 million, to include accrued interest plus the original principal
of $6.2 million.

Concluding Remarks
The system explained above is the result of unfounded promises, an expensive
cost-plus contract, high-interest loan agreements, and a flawed political process. In
1987, the Contract stated that the cost would be about $43 million. To date, about
$80 million has been paid to contractors, subcontractors, and sub-subcontractors.
The total owed to date for borrowed funds and accrued interest is alxmt $152 million, and no construction has taken place.
An estimated date for beginning operation is January 1, 2001. By then, the total
value on the loans will have increased to about $350 million. Those loans plus construction costs, plus construction financing, plus adders, plus miscellaneous cost
could reach an estimated $500 million by 200 1. That is an estimate of the cost before inclusion of operating costs; inclusion of funding for safety, closure, and postoperation maintenance funds; and of new cost-plus adders. This is the cost package
on a facility projected to receive about 5,000 cubic feet of LLRW per year. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the system will not work.
The CIC record is one of civil and political turmoil, a continuous parade of lawsuits, expensive cost-plus adders, reformulations of contracts, cost overruns, an executive director imprisoned, instances of raw intimidation, excessive interest costs
on loans, a heavy burden placed on various groups, and nothing built. That is the
record of a flawed political process that has ignored institutional realities. This project's record confirms Melman's warnings. We need to return the issue of how to
dispose of LLRW to the federal government for a new-and better-solution.
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Notes
1. Cost-plus contracts use more resources than necessary to reach an industrial production
level. Thus, they impose a heavier pollution load on the ecological system and a greater
resource taking from the ecological system.
2. Net income of AEC fell from $7.4 million in 1991 to a negative of $ - 48 million in 1995.
AEC's current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities) fell from 1.5 in 1991 to
.6 in 1995. The quick ratio (current assets convertible into cash divided by current liabilities) fell from 1.48 in 1991 to .59 in 1995. The debt to equity ratio (long-term debt divided by long-term debt plus total equity) deteriorated from 1.3 percent in 1991 to 56.3
percent in 1995. AEC's net working capital fell from $7.8 million in 1991 to a negative of
$ - 16.1 million in 1995.
3. The Contract places the major decisions in the hands of the contractor, AEC. The CIC office has neither research staff nor decision models. Therefore, the commissioners are left
in a "rubber stamp" position with regard to plans and work reports of AEC.
4. Because the purpose here is to define the institutional flows as they are processed, some
real costs are ignored because they are ignored by the organizations making decisions.
Only monetary flows are included in the formula. For example, the lease value of the
equipment paid for by CIC and used by Bechtel and AEC is not paid, so it is not included
in the formula.
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